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Purpose – This paper aims to present an analysis of the association between five categories of
concentrated ownership and firm performance in Pakistan. The connection between high ownership
concentration and firm performance has attracted much attention, especially in emerging market, yet
yielded many inconsistent empirical results.
Design/methodology/approach – Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)-100 Indexed companies listed in KSE
from 2007 to 2011 were selected as the sample, and correlation coefficient and regression model were used
to inspect the relationship between ownership concentration degree and corporate performance.
Findings – It was found that there is no significant association with ownership concentration and
accounting-based performance, market-based performance measures and economic profit, in general.
Originality/value – The first demonstration that the shareholding proportion of the single largest
shareholder is the only variable having positive association with market-based performance measures.
Keywords Ownership, Agency theory
Paper type Research paper
Corrigendum
It has come to the attention of the publisher that the paper “Effects of ownership concentration on
firm performance: Pakistani evidence” published in the Journal of Asia Business Studies, Vol. 9
No. 2, did not acknowledge the contribution of the second author Mr Abdullah Al Mamun,
Newcastle Business School, University of Newcastle, Newcastle, Australia. Emerald and the
author sincerely apologises for this. The online version has now been corrected.
1. Introduction
The relationship between ownership structure and corporation performance is one that has
received considerable attention in finance literature (Jiang, 2004). For a few decades,
considerable energy has been devoted to trying to explain differing corporate ownership
structures in different countries and its effect on financial performance. La Porta et al.
(1998) find that the quality of legal protection of shareholders helps to determine ownership
concentration, in countries with relatively poor legal protection of investors; publicly listed
companies are likely to have large blockholders. Roe (2000) put a counter argument to
explain ownership differences in terms of politics. In particular, those publicly listed
companies in social democracies are more likely to have concentrated ownership than their
counterparts in the USA. Bebchuk (1999) develops a model which predicts that the
proportion of a country’s publicly listed firms having a controlling shareholder depends on
the size of private benefits of control in the corporate sector. In particular, he demonstrates
that, when private benefits of control are large, a founder is very unlikely to relinquish
control after the initial public offer (IPO). Therefore, in those countries where private benefits
of control are comparatively large, large blockholdings should be relatively prevalent in
publicly listed companies.
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